There are national crises that strike suddenly. We have seen them before. A military conflict , an economic collapse , a major natural disaster . But there are also crises that are more insidious , which develop so slowly that society learns to live with them. Every year the situation gets a little worse, without ever sounding the alarm that would be heard if the same loss happened in a day.
Demographics is exactly such a crisis.
According to ELSTAT data, in 2025 only 65,594 children were born in Greece, 2,873 fewer than in 2024. The decrease reached 4.2% in one year and was recorded in 12 of the country’s 13 regions . However, the numbers do not reveal the whole problem.
A country that is aging and shrinking is not only facing social difficulties. It is gradually losing part of its national power . The power of a state is not measured exclusively in aircraft , frigates and GDP . It is based on people , on a productive population , on workers , on scientists , on conscripts , on families that inhabit the region, on young people who create and remain in the country.
Without this human base , everything else becomes more difficult.
Who will support the social security system when the ratio of active to inactive population is deteriorating? Who will staff the Armed Forces ? Who will keep small towns and villages economically active? And most importantly, who will live on the border islands , in Evros and in areas that are already losing population?
Here, demographics cease to be a social policy file in the ministry of every “Domna” and become a matter of strategic depth . A populated border does not have the same strategic value as a border that is emptying . An island with young families , a school , a doctor and economic activity is not the same national size as an island in which the population is aging, children are dwindling and services are being withdrawn one after the other.
And yet, despite the seriousness of the situation, the Greek State continues to treat demographics more as a problem to be managed than as a national emergency .
The government will respond that it has taken measures. It will say that it created the Ministry of Social Cohesion and Family . It will argue that there is a National Action Plan , birth benefits , housing programs , maternity support , daycare centers and dozens of other actions.
I do not question the existence of these interventions, but their adequacy as a national strategy . Because a strategy is not evaluated by how many actions are announced, but by whether it changes the reality for which it was designed.
And the reality continues to worsen .
This is precisely where the difference between activity and strategy lies. A state may have dozens of programs and yet not have changed the direction of events. Indifference, after all, does not always manifest itself in inaction. It can also manifest itself as an absence of a sense of urgency .
The government has shown that it accepts as normal that fewer children are born every year. And all it does is discuss the problem at conferences. Present new actions and when the next numbers are worse again, announce yet another program.
And he believes that this is not enough. He cannot or does not want to understand that demographics require a clear national goal . We need a state that states without ambiguity that it wants more children , more young families , stronger large and three-child families , the return of young people to the region and the real possibility for a couple to start a family without feeling that they are risking their economic survival.
And it is precisely at this point that the recent statements of the Minister of Social Cohesion and Family cause reasonable concern.
Domna Michaelidou , speaking at the Most Powerful Women Summit , stated that “the Greek family of the future does not exist.” She also explained that the family with two parents and three children cannot be considered a typical future model. Later, after the outcry, she clarified that the state must support every type of family.
But demographics pose a different question.
Can a country facing serious demographic decline not have a specific demographic model to encourage ?
The country needs much more than benefits . It needs to make the life plan possible again. A young person does not decide whether to have children based solely on the amount of a birth benefit. They decide by looking ahead.
Can she find a house ? Can she hold down a decent job ? Can she raise two or three children without going broke financially? If she lives in the countryside, will there be a school , a doctor , and basic services ? If she is a woman, will she pay professionally for the decision to become a mother ? These are the real demographic questions .
And that is why this issue cannot belong exclusively to one ministry. Housing policy is demographic policy, neither is taxation , nor is employment . Health in the region is demographic policy. The operation of a school in a remote village is also demographic policy.
Even national defense has a demographic dimension.
So if we really believe that we are facing a national crisis , every major government policy must also pass through a simple filter. Does this decision help a young person stay in Greece, start a family and have more children? If not, then demographics will remain a nice title for government plans.
That is why Antonis Samaras ‘ warnings deserve special attention.
In his speech in Heraklion in June, he called the demographic crisis “our first national problem” and directly linked it to the abandonment of the Greek countryside . He also said something that perhaps describes the political problem better than anything else. That he does not see the political system “burning” to do anything.
A few weeks later, commenting on Domna Michaelidou ‘s statements, he accused the government of choosing different priorities instead of strengthening the traditional family in a period of acute demographic problems.
One may agree or disagree with the former Prime Minister, but the question remains:
Does Greece really want to reverse its demographic course , or has it begun to come to terms with the idea that it will become smaller , older , and more concentrated in a few large urban centers?
The answer to this question will determine much more than a government’s social policy. It will determine the country’s productive capacity , the viability of the welfare state , and the manning of the Armed Forces . Ultimately, it will determine part of our national strength itself.
Inaction is not forgiven and Greece does not need a state that will learn to manage its contraction more effectively.
It takes a state that decides that it will not compromise with it .
NIKOLAOS GIANNOPOULOS (Lieutenant General (retd) – Doctor of the National University of Athens)
