Finally, the heat wave is not enough for us. We also have our “beloved” neighbors from the East, who seem to have decided that the Aegean does not even deserve a summer break.
Only this time things are much more serious than Ankara’s usual verbal provocations. The latest mass violations of Greek airspace by Turkish fighter jets and drones , the moves with Turkish “marine parks” and now Ankara’s direct reaction to the Greek plan for Renewable Energy Sources compose a picture that can hardly be hidden behind wishful thinking.
The policy of “calm waters” has reached its limits.
And perhaps it’s time to admit that the waters were calm only as long as Turkey believed it served its interests .
The successive violations of the last few days cannot be treated as some random outburst of well-known Turkish provocation. The participation of fighter jets and drones reveals a different operational reality and, most importantly, a way in which Ankara can constantly test Greek reflexes at a much lower cost .
And now another challenge has been added, perhaps more politically important than it seems at first glance.
Greece has decided to define the new Special Spatial Planning Framework for Renewable Energy Sources , establishing rules for the siting of RES projects on both the islands and the Aegean sea.
And what exactly is this about?
The exercise of Greek state competence and the planning of Greece in its own space.
And yet, Turkey was quick to react.
Ankara claimed that the Greek spatial plan does not supposedly produce “legal consequences” for it and, even worse, threw the entire theory of “gray zones” out the window, referring to geographical formations whose sovereignty, according to the Turkish version, has not been granted to Greece through international agreements.
Let’s understand what exactly is happening here.
Turkey no longer reacts only when Greece arms itself. It does not react only for territorial waters. It does not react only for the continental shelf and the EEZ. It even intervenes when Greece regulates the framework for the development of Renewable Energy Sources in the Aegean.
This is not “good neighborhood.”
It is a gradual expansion of the Turkish challenge .
And this is precisely where the great danger lies. Every time we accept that a self-evident Greek competence is transformed into a subject of Greek-Turkish discussion, Ankara gains another step towards transforming the Aegean from an area of Greek sovereignty and legitimate Greek rights into an area of permanent negotiation .
This is the real stakes.
Because today it’s RES. Yesterday it was marine parks. The day before yesterday it was electrical interconnection. For decades it’s been territorial waters, the continental shelf, airspace, demilitarization and the notorious “gray zones.”
Every time something new is added to the list of Turkish claims.
And the longer the list grows, the more we risk becoming accustomed to questioning itself.
This is exactly what should not happen.
The Greek-Turkish approach can be useful when it functions as a mechanism for real de-escalation. However, it cannot be turned into an alibi for complacency . Calm has value when it is based on mutual respect and not when it is used by one side to prepare for the next challenge.
And anyone who seriously follows Turkey knows that Ankara never treats a period of de-escalation as a period of inaction .
He exploits it.
It has done so now, while strengthening its international and defense relations. The recent joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is objectively a significant geopolitical success for Ankara and shows that Turkey is attempting to continuously expand its strategic footprint.
Turkey does not wait for developments. It tries to create them.
And herein lies the great problem of Greek strategy. We often continue to treat foreign policy as an exercise in avoiding tension, while the opposing side uses it as a tool for accumulating power, expanding influence, and gradually creating faits accomplis .
We’ve experienced it before.
The Imia of 1996 should be a permanent lesson for every Greek government. Not because every Turkish move necessarily leads to a new 1996, but because it was there that a basic rule of geopolitics was reflected in the most painful way:
Faits accomplis are created when the opponent believes that the cost of challenging is less than the potential benefit.
That’s why deterrence is not warmongering.
Deterrence means convincing the other person that it is not in their best interest to test your mettle.
We risk making the same mistake in our relationship with the United States. Greece has no reason to seek to go “under the radar” of the Trump administration.
The transactional logic of today’s White House does not reward those who disappear from the map. It rewards those who have power, offer strategic value, and know how to negotiate it .
Greece has geography, ports, energy potential, strong Armed Forces and a pivotal position between the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
In international politics, it is not the one who becomes invisible who wins. It is the one who becomes necessary who wins.
But there is something even more urgent.
Drones are changing the rules of the game in the Aegean.
Turkey has invested in unmanned aerial vehicles for years and today can use cheaper means for surveillance, reconnaissance and pressure, forcing Greece to react with much more expensive systems.
It is neither economically nor operationally sensible to constantly rely on extremely expensive manned fighter jets to counter much cheaper unmanned systems .
Every takeoff means cost. It means flight hours. It means maintenance. It means strain on the aircraft and, above all, on the Greek pilots .
This balance must change.
Greece needs its own multi-role drones , modern anti-drone systems , electronic warfare, sensor networks, artificial intelligence for rapid threat identification, and an integrated system that can detect, track, and deal with unmanned aerial vehicles at a cost commensurate with the threat.
Because modern warfare has changed.
It’s not just the one with the most expensive weapon who wins. It’s the one who sees first, decides faster, and reacts more cheaply and effectively who wins.
The wars of recent years have demonstrated this in the most dramatic way. Algorithms, machine vision, data, autonomous systems, cheap drones, and electronic warfare have radically changed the field of operations.
And the defense of the Aegean cannot be planned as if we were still in the 1990s.
We need a true new generation national defense dome . We need cooperation between the Armed Forces and Greek technology companies, universities, research centers and the private deep-tech sector .
Greece has scientists. It has engineers. It has minds that excel throughout the world.
What is needed is a state that will give them a goal, funding, speed, and operational space to create .
And above all, something else is needed: clear political will .
Greece does not need war with Turkey. Quite the opposite.
But Turkey needs to know that Greece is not afraid to defend what belongs to it and what it is entitled to .
These are two completely different concepts.
Peace is not secured through weakness. De-escalation is not achieved because one side decides not to react. And good neighborliness cannot mean that Turkey will constantly add new demands and Greece will constantly try not to spoil the atmosphere .
Real peace needs strong deterrence.
It needs diplomacy based on military credibility. It needs alliances based on real interests. It needs technological superiority. And it needs the other side to know that there are red lines that don’t move every time Ankara raises the tone .
“Calm waters” were useful as long as they were actually calm.
But when Turkey questions Greek marine parks, sends fighter jets and drones to the Aegean, and even interferes in Greek spatial planning for renewable energy , then the problem is not simply that the waters have ceased to be calm.
The problem is that Ankara is attempting to determine how far Greece’s right to decide for itself extends.
And there the answer cannot be ambiguous.
Greece does not need to provoke any crisis. But it must be strong enough that no one considers it in their interest to provoke a crisis against it.
This is deterrence.
And perhaps it’s time to abandon the most dangerous illusion of all:
That because we desire “calm waters”, Turkey is obliged to desire them too.
Because, as it is proven again, “calm waters” can very easily boil over . And Greece must be ready before that happens.
MAXIMOS TH. KYPRIANOU
